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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-ZONING-FLOOD

PLAIN REGULATION*-

Flood plain zoning-the regulation of land use development in areas
reasonably susceptible to being flooded-has been rather widely
enacted over the past fifteen years by municipal and county governments. However, unlike the closely related area of channel-encroachment legislation, the purpose of which is to maintain an adequate
flood channel for a watercourse by preventing flow-constricting development, no reported case appears to have directly passed upon
the validity of a flood plain zoning ordinance prior to Dooley v.
Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n. 1
In February, 1961, the defendant town amended its zoning regulations to create a new flood plain district in which the only permitted uses were those in the nature of parks, boat houses and docks,
clubhouses, wildlife sanctuaries, farming, and motor vehicle parking.
A subsequent amendment prohibited the excavation or filling of earth
within the district other than by special exception. The court found
that ninety-one per cent of the acreage of the district was tidal
marshland and almost all of the remaining nine per cent was below
the flood levels caused by the hurricanes of 1938, 1944, and 1954.
Most of the land, both the tidal marshland and the higher ground,
was publicly owned. The plaintiffs, who both owned and were under
a contract to purchase certain of the land covered by the new zone,
claimed that the application of the ordinance to their property constituted a taking without compensation and without due process of
law.
The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs because "the use of the plaintiffs' land has been, for all practical purposes, rendered impossible."12 Examining the list of permitted uses,
the court found that parks and wildlife sanctuaries were essentially
public uses, that the land was too far from water to be used for boat* Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964).
1. 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964).
2. 197 A.2d at 772.
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houses and docks, that the right to build a clubhouse "would have
little effect in preventing substantial diminution in the value of the
land," 3 that farming was not practical, and that as to parking, a special exception for filling or paving would be required which could be
granted only for a limited time and under stringent conditions. The
court accepted the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert that the zoning
regulations caused a seventy-five per cent depreciation in the value of
the property. The court then found that, at least with some filling
in of the land of one of the plaintiffs, the property could be used for
residential construction. Finally, the court rejected the argument that
the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies by
applying for a variance because a variance cannot properly be
granted where its effect would be to cause a substantial change in the
uses permitted in the zone, as would be the case here.
The holding of the case can be accepted as correct if it is limited
closely to the facts there presented. However, the danger is that,
because the facts will probably be similar to the typical flood plain
zoning case of the future, it may come to stand for the proposition
that flood plain zoning as such is unconstitutional.
One basis for distinguishing the case in the future may rest on the
fact that the Fairfield zoning regulations only permitted, by special
exception, the filling in of land "under stringent conditions, and then
only for a limited time." This, in effect, precluded the permanent
raising of the level of the ground above the flood danger level. Such
a restriction could be viewed as unreasonable if, as it appears, the
zoning regulation was not directed against flood-channel encroachment but only against the loss of life and property that would be
caused by tidal flooding if significant development were permitted
on the flood plain. It may be noted that the defendant did not argue
that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies by not applying for
this exception.
While the above distinction would, from the language of the
opinion, clearly apply only to the land of one of the plaintiffs, the
other plaintiff's situation can be distinguished by the fact that the
town had levied an $11,000 sewer assessment against his property, a
sewer that would have been worthless for the uses permitted by the
zoning regulation; the act of the defendant in imposing this levy
might be considered to have estopped it from asserting that the
land was not fit for residential use.
3. 197 A.2d at 773.
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More importantly, the case makes evident some of the pitfalls to
be avoided in flood plain zoning regulation and litigation. First, the
court found that there was no permitted private use to which the
land could be put which would afford the owner a fair profit. The
court may have been correct since, if the land had been frequently
flooded, the salt from the ocean would have rendered the land unsuitable for farming. While a clubhouse might have rendered a profit,
considering the acreage involved it is possible that a fair return could
not be expected on the land as a whole. And it is hardly likely that
motor vehicle parking would be in great demand in a relatively undeveloped area. The point to be made is that the drafters of the
ordinance did not sufficiently enumerate permitted profitable uses.
Possible additional uses for this area might have been golf courses,
picnic grounds, skeet shooting ranges, transient amusement enterprises, storage yards for scrap metal, roadside stands for the sale
of food or fishing bait, riding stables, etc. It is not enough for the
municipality to say that a variance probably would be granted if
application were made for such a use. As here, a court may strike the
ordinance as a whole if the listed permitted uses are inadequate.'
Furthermore, filling in the flood plain area should be permitted so
as to permit the owner to raise the land above the flood-danger line,
at least to the extent that such filling would not cause constriction of
the flood channel of the watercourse. In the Dooley case channel-encroachment would not have been a consideration since only tidal
flooding appears to have been involved.
Second, the opinion noted that some of the land was higher in
elevation and not as subject to flooding. Yet the defendant set up
only one zone with the same permitted uses for the entire area. This
4. See, e.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587
(1938). In 1928, after an ordinance had been amended to classify the plaintiff's
property as residential, the plaintiff was denied a variance for a gas station in a
residential zone. Later, in 1936, the plaintiff brought suit to have the amended ordinance
declared unconstitutional. The court found that the plaintiff's land could not profitably
be used for residential purposes in the foreseeable future. The court then concluded
that since the ordinance permanently restricted the use of the plaintiff's property so
that it could not be used for any reasonable or profitable purpose, the ordinance
resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's property without compensation.
However, the court also concluded that the plaintiff's original application for a variance
had properly been refused:
the conditions which render the plaintiff's property unsuitable for residential
use are general and not confined to the plaintiff's property. In such case . . .
the general hardship should be remedied by revision of the general regulation,
not by granting the special privilege of a variation to single owners.
15 N.E.2d at 592.
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should serve as a warning that the flood plain zone should have
several levels of restrictiveness, depending on the flood frequency of
the area involved.5 Severe restrictions may, and should, be imposed
on frequently flooded areas, while in areas rarely flooded the only
requirement might be the flood proofing of structures and a prohibition against the erection of prisons, schools, hospitals, and the like. It
is evident that the entire flood plain is not subject to the same degree
of flood danger and to impose only one set of permitted uses upon the
area is a definite step toward unreasonableness.
Third, there is no evidence that the defendant either employed any
experts or introduced any hydrologic data to establish the flood
danger. Certainly it would have been appropriate to have expert
testimony in opposition to the plaintiff's contention, apparently based
on residential use of the land, that the zoning regulation caused
depreciation in value of at least seventy-five per cent. For if the land
had been flooded three times in twenty-five years and this accurately
reflected the flood frequency of the area, the land is not appropriate
for construction of homes. Furthermore, every flood plain zoning
regulation should rest upon a scientific hydrologic basis. While the
opinion gives some indication that the Fairfield ordinance was so
grounded, there is no sign that the defendant attempted to introduce
such evidence into the litigation to emphasize the reasonableness of
the regulation and the flood danger.
EDWARD W. BEUCHERTt

t Member of the State Bar of New York.
5. While this particular approach has not yet become common, it is not unusual for
municipalities to regulate the flood channel in one way to avoid channel encroachments,
and regulate the rest of the flood plain in a less restrictive manner. See Iowa City,
Iowa, Zoning Ordinance, Art. VI.

